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Traffic Signals — February 2026

TRAFFIC SIGNALS NEWSLETTER

Dear Colleagues,March 9, 2026

This newsletter sets out a summary of Ohio court decisions issued last month concerning impaired driving, alcohol and drugs of abuse, and other procedural related issues that may be raised in these cases. While not all of the cases involve impaired driving, they raise pretrial and post-judgment issues that would apply to OVI and vehicular homicide and assault cases.

The case summaries provide recent appellate decisions regarding Ohio law as applied to factual matters as well as interpretations and application of statutes and prior case law. Some cases also set out specific fact situations for determining reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or sentencing criteria which may be of assistance when reviewing motions to suppress.

As always, I am grateful to Paul Pfeifer, Trina Bennington, and the Ohio Judicial Conference staff for assistance in the distribution of the newsletter. Please feel free to call or email me with any feedback.

Patrick Carroll, retired judge

Ohio Judicial Outreach Liaison to the ABA

Carrolljol26@gmail.com

(216) 403-5521

1. Supreme Court of Ohio

State v. Ballish, 2026-Ohio-503. Probation conditions in misdemeanor theft conviction prohibiting use of drugs and alcohol and from entering a bar were reversed by the appellate court and reinstated by the Supreme Court. The theft offense in this case was not alcohol related, but the defendant had a history of alcohol related offenses. A trial court’s authority to impose probation conditions was set out by the Court in State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51 (1990), which limited the trial court’s discretion for offenses that

1) were reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender,

2) had some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and

3) related to conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of probation.

The record did not show any facts that either alcohol or drugs contributed to the theft offense. The court of appeals found the probation conditions did not meet the requirements under Jones, even though the defendant had a past record of alcohol and drug related offenses in the court.

Reinstating the no drug/alcohol condition, the Supreme Court noted that since the Jones decision, legislative changes were enacted in 2004 regarding misdemeanor sentencing. R.C. 2929.27 set out a non-exhaustive list of sanctions and probation conditions a court may impose, including drug and alcohol monitoring. R.C. 2929.27(A)(8). The Court recognized the conflict between the standard set out in Jones and probation conditions expressly authorized by statute. (Par. 24). Factors to be considered for sentencing are set out in R.C. 2929.22(B)(2), which are considerably broader that the Jones standard, include the defendant’s criminal history. R.C. 2929.22(B)(1)(b). As such, the standard set out in Jones does not apply to probation conditions expressly authorized by statute. (Par. 24).

Regarding continued viability of the Jones standard, the Court held Jones still applies to additional, non -statutory conditions. See also, R.C. 2929.25(C)(2), permitting probation conditions, “In the interests of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and ensuring the offender's good behavior.” (Par. 26). In the present case, as the probation conditions of no alcohol or drugs with monitoring was statutorily authorized, it was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to impose these probation conditions.

2. Ohio court of appeals decisions.

Community control violation for alcohol use.

City of Bowling Green v. Lewis, 2026-Ohio 422 (6^th. Dist.). Community control supervision violation for alcohol consumption was affirmed. The defendant was found guilty of reckless operation of a vehicle, a fourth degree misdemeanor, and placed on community control supervision. During the community control term the defendant was convicted of another reckless operation offense which gave rise to a community control violation. The defendant admitted the violation and community control was continued with additional conditions to complete a driver intervention program and no driving violations or traffic offenses involving alcohol or drugs of abuse. The defendant was also required to wear an alcohol monitoring bracelet for thirty days.

Subsequently, the defendant was cited for new community control violations due to three separate positive alcohol results from the alcohol monitor. An evidentiary hearing was conducted which included the testimony of the alcohol monitoring company manager who explained the three positive alcohol reports from the defendant’s monitor. The defendant testified that he had not consumed alcohol on the three days and presented witnesses who were with him at those times to support his testimony. (Par. 16-17). After the hearing the defendant was found to be in violation and a five day jail sentence was imposed.

On appeal the defendant asserted the positive alcohol report was not a violation as it was not part of the original community control supervision. The court noted, however, that R.C. 2929.25(D)(2) authorizes the court to impose more restrictive conditions with a community control violation. In addition, although the trial court did not expressly prohibit alcohol consumption, the court required the defendant to comply with the alcohol monitor, which included no alcohol consumption. (Par. 25).

Affirming the community control violation the appellate court also distinguished level of proof:

1. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt for a criminal conviction and

2. Substantial proof of violation of community control conditions. (Par. 27, citations omitted.).

OVI conviction with harmful intoxicants.

State v. Cohen, 2026-Ohio-410 (5^th. Dist.). OVI conviction was affirmed. A passenger in another vehicle saw another car driving erratically and called the police. The driver followed the car until the police arrived. The passenger saw the defendant/driver going 20 miles per hour in a 45 MPH zone, braking erratically speeding up, then slowing down, driving through stop signs, almost hitting a guardrail, and going left of center several times, completely into the left lane and then back to the other lane. (Par. 4). When the officer responded she saw the car roll through a stop sign and then turn his headlights off, even though it was near midnight and “pitch black.” (Par. 5).

The defendant did not stop when the officer put on the overhead lights behind him, but did so a few moments later when she added the siren. The defendant had watery, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech and could not understand the officer’s questions of where he was going and where he lived. He also had an odor of alcohol and burnt marijuana. The defendant refused to get out of the car for field sobriety tests and once arrested for OVI, became belligerent.

At the trial the defendant admitted to drinking one beer and smoking marijuana earlier that day. The defendant said he was working with enamel based paint on a construction job that day and later, was exposed to a bug defogger while sleeping at the site. Defendant’s expert witness testified both the paint and the defogger have central nervous system depressant effects upon an individual. The jury returned a guilty verdict on the OVI charge.

On appeal, the defendant asserted he was entitled to an involuntary intoxication jury instruction. The appellate court found OVI was a strict liability offense and the involuntary intoxication defense did not apply.¹ (Par. 20). Citing State v. Johnson, 2020-Ohio-6395, the court noted, “Strict liability offenses impose liability for simply doing a prohibited act.” (Par. 21). Moreover, R.C. 2901.21(B), which provides a culpable mental states of recklessness when a criminal offense does not contain a culpable mental state, specifically excludes offenses under R.C. Chap. 45. R.C. 2901.21(C).

Rejecting the defendant’s claim of accidental or involuntary intoxication from the paint and defogger fumes, the court noted that both substances met the classification of a harmful intoxicant under R.C. 2925.01.² Reviewing the evidence, the court noted the defendant was impaired while driving. Although the defendant claimed inhaling the fumes created an emergency medical condition, the court noted the defendant did not call 911 or anyone else, but instead decided to get behind the wheel and drive home. (Par. 34).

Author’s note: Other courts have also affirmed OVI convictions based on inhaling work related harmful intoxicants. See, State v. Apple, 2002-Ohio-6731 (5^th. Dist.) (driving home after spraying lacquer at work without the appropriate mask) and  State v. Zemljic, 2021-Ohio-2181 (11^th. Dist.) (impairment resulted from using flea treatment chemicals without proper ventilation).   

Traffic violation and probable cause.

1. Turn signal violation.

State v. Bryant, 2026-Ohio-389 (12^th. Dist.). An order granting a motion to suppress was reversed on appeal. The defendant was stopped for making a left turn without a turn signal. The defendant approached a stop sign at a four way intersection with the officer to the right of the defendant at the intersection. After the officer flashed his headlights for the defendant to proceed straight, the defendant put on a left turn signal and made a left turn. Finding the defendant’s conduct suspicious by suddenly driving in an opposite direction, the officer pulled the defendant over. When the officer attempted to get the defendant’s identification, the defendant fled on foot. A subsequent inventory of the car found cocaine.

The local ordinance, similar to R.C. 4511.39(A), requires a driver a driver to signal a right or left turn at least 100 feet before the turn “when required.” (quotation marks added). The trial court found the turn signal was not required in this case because the defendant’s turn posed no danger to other traffic. (Par. 7, 14). Finding no traffic violation, the trial court granted the motion to suppress.

On suppression order was reversed on appeal. Citing State v. Lowman, 82 Ohio App.3d 831 (12th Dist. 1992), R.C. 4511.39(A) impose two distinct duties: a requirement of reasonable care in changing directions and a requirement to use a signal. (Par. 15).

The phrase "when required" simply refers to a situation in which the driver intends to change direction on the roadway. The phrase refers to the signal requirement as set forth in the first paragraph of the statute, and again there is no indication that this language was intended to make the requirement conditional. State v. Lowman, 82 Ohio App.3d at 835.

The court in Bryant noted other courts have also interpreted “when required” of a turn signal the same way. (Par. 17, citations omitted.). The appellate court found in the absence of a timely turn signal, the officer conducted a valid traffic stop.

The defendant also argued that the officer’s flashing his headlights was a lawful police order under R.C. 2921.331 and the defendant’s need to comply superseded the turn signal requirement. (Par. 24). The court found the headlight flash was a customary courtesy that drivers extend to one another at four-way stops and not a police directive carrying the force of a police order. (Par. 26). The court further noted the officer’s headlight flash did not excuse the defendant’s conduct because it occurred when the defendant was stopped at the intersection after the defendant failed to signal at least 100 feet before the intersection. (Par. 27).

The concurring opinion acknowledged the confusing statutory directive to use a turn signal, but the issue was not whether the defendant committed a traffic violation, but whether the officer had the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe, even if mistakenly, that the defendant had committed a traffic violation. The concurring opinion noted reasonable mistakes of law can still constitute reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying the initiation of a traffic stop.  State v. Egnor, 2020-Ohio-327 (12th Dist.) (Par. 41, other citations omitted.).

State v. Thompson, 2026-Ohio-398 (11^th. Dist.). Traffic stop for lack of turn signal was affirmed, but conviction to hidden drug compartment was reversed.³ The defendant was stopped for making a right hand turn without a turn signal. The officer was familiar with the defendant and had seen the defendant earlier in the day driving a different car. The defendant was not the registered owner of the current car. The defendant was pulled over for the turn signal violation. At the stop, the officer had trouble verifying the passenger’s identity. While doing so, another officer arrived with a drug dog. The dog gave a positive alert to narcotics in the car. During the search of the car the carpet was pulled back and a baggie of methamphetamine and cocaine was discovered.

Regarding the validity of the stop, “The failure to activate a turn signal in compliance with R.C. 4511.39(A) is a traffic violation that provides a law enforcement officer ‘with a legal justification to initiate a traffic stop.’" (Par. 34, citations omitted.).

With the detention after the stop, Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015) held that "a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures.” 575 U.S. at 350-351. A stop may be prolonged if during the course of the traffic stop the officer discovers something that would provide reasonable, articulable suspicion beyond the initial traffic stop. In the present case the court found the any delay for the traffic stop was due to the difficulty identifying the passenger’s identity and not to add more time for the drug dog to arrive. (Par. 37). The dog arrived approximately eight minutes after the initial stop, which the court found was not an unreasonable delay and did not prolong the original traffic citation mission. (Par. 38).

State v. Pope, 2026-Ohio-**** (3d. Dist.). Conviction for cocaine possession was affirmed, but reversed on lack of advisement of post-release control requirements at sentencing.⁴ The driver stopped at the stop sign, put on his turn signal while stopped, and made a turn onto another street. The defendant was a back seat passenger. The car was stopped for a traffic violation by not using the turn signal at least 100 feet before the turn. R.C. 4511.39. During the course of the traffic stop the defendant kept his hand inside his pants, despite the officers’ command for the defendant to show his hands. For officer safety, the defendant was removed from the car. Cocaine and a nitrile glove were found in the defendant’s pant leg. A motion to suppress the traffic stop was overruled and the defendant entered a no contest plea to the drug charge.

The suppression issue was raised on appeal by a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Although defense counsel filed a motion to suppress, the defendant claimed counsel was ineffective for only challenging the validity of the traffic stop and not the credibility of the citing officer. The officer’s car was not equipped with a dash camera because he was a K9 handler which did not have a camera unit. The officer had a body camera and the video of the stop and arrest were presented to the court along with the officer’s testimony.

The court noted the absence of a motion to suppress is not by itself proof of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389, 2000-Ohio-448. (Par. 11). The absence of a video recording of the stop is not grounds for suppression as the “officer's testimony alone is sufficient to establish reasonable articulable suspicion for a stop." State v. McClellan, 2010-Ohio-314 (3d Dist.). (Par. 11). In the present case the court found the officer’s credibility on the validity of the traffic stop was put at issue simply by challenging the legality of the stop. Moreover, the defendant offered no evidence to dispute either the officer’s statements or the body camera video to show a different result on the motion to suppress. Having failed to show any evidence of either deficient performance by defense counsel or a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceeding's result would have been different, the court overruled the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  

2. Obstructed license plate.

State v. Campbell, 2026-Ohio-334 (5^th. Dist.). Convictions for obstructed license plate and obstruction of justice were affirmed. Driving through a known drug area shortly after midnight, the officer noticed a car with a dark license plate cover, making the plate unreadable. The officer turned on his overhead lights and as he approached the car with the bright police car lights, he could read the plate. At the stop the defendant showed, but refused to give his driver’s license to the officer and refused to get out of the car. After being ordered multiple times the officer with back up pulled the defendant out of the car. At a jury trial the defendant was found guilty of obstruction of official business but not guilty of resisting arrest. The defendant was also found guilty by the court of driving with an obstructed license plate

Obstructed license plate.

R.C. 4503.21(A)(2) provides a license plate shall be securely fastened so as not to swing and shall not be covered by any material that obstructs its visibility. It is a strict liability offense. R.C. 4503.21(C). The defendant’s license plate could not be reasonably viewed by the officer or other motorists using the roadway under normal lighting conditions and could only be read after the officer used his bright overhead lights.

Jury view.

The police video was used as evidence of the obstructed plate. The trial court denied the defendant’s request for a jury view of the plate. On appeal the court noted a jury view is discretionary with the court. (Par. 24, citations omitted.). Both parties presented photographic evidence of the license plate along with the police video. The court noted the video depicted the traffic stop as it occurred. On this issue the test is whether a jury view would meaningfully aid its fact-finding. (Par. 28). Moreover, a jury view would not recreate the lighting conditions, viewing angles, distance, and motion of the vehicle when the officer observed the plate from his cruiser. (Par. 27).

The court also rejected the defendant’s “best evidence” argument, noting that Evidence Rule 1002 is limited to writings, recordings, and photographs. The rule does not apply to testimony concerning the condition or appearance of a physical object. (Par. 31).

Odor of marijuana as probable cause.

State v. Dejournett, 2026-Ohio-640 (9^th. Dist.). (2-1 decision). An order overruling a motion to suppress and conviction for weapons under disability were affirmed. The defendant was stopped for speeding and the officer smelled burnt marijuana from the car. The car was searched with a firearm and small bag of raw marijuana discovered. After the court overruled a motion to suppress the defendant entered a no contest plea and was found guilty.

Odor of marijuana.

The defendant asserted on appeal that because marijuana is not per se illegal, there was no reasonable articulable suspicion to inquire beyond the traffic citation and search the car. The court held, however, it is illegal to smoke marijuana in a vehicle. R.C. 3780.36(D)(2). The issue in this case was not limited to possession of marijuana or whether the defendant was impaired. Based on the officer’s smell of recently burnt marijuana, there was a reasonable suspicion that it was being smoked in the car prior to the stop.

Community control conditions.

The defendant objected to the prohibition under community control of all illegal drugs, including medical marijuana. The plea in this case was based on a stipulated sentence with the prosecutor that the trial court agreed to accept. The agreed sentence did not preclude the defendant from objecting to the community control conditions. (Par. 11, citations omitted.).

The court noted the statutory community control condition to abide by all laws would include refraining from illegal drugs, State v. White, 2015-Ohio-3844 (10^th. Dist.). (Par. 12). Although conditionally permitted under R.C. 3780.36, marijuana remains a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(I)(c)(10). The court also informed the defendant to present a valid medical marijuana card to the probation officer and discuss and modification of medical marijuana use with the probation officer. (Par. 13). As of the time of sentencing medical marijuana remined prohibited as a community control condition.

The dissent asserted that marijuana was now legal in Ohio for adults over 21 years old and the smell of marijuana by itself was not grounds, by itself, to search the defendant’s car. Although State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47 (1990), held the odor of marijuana was grounds to search a car, the case was decided when both medical and adult use marijuana were illegal. The dissent relied on State v. Gray, 2025-Ohio- 4607 (1^st. Dist.), which held the Moore decision was no longer valid because the smell of marijuana is not indicative of criminal activity. (Par. 19, citing Gray.).⁵ Although the dissent analogized marijuana to alcohol, unlike alcohol, possession of marijuana is limited to a specific quantity. R.C. 3780.36(B).

United States v. Rowe, Case No. 2:25-cr-157, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38022, 2026 WL 507414 (S.D. Ohio). A motion to suppress from traffic stop was granted in part and denied in part. The defendant was stopped for speeding while he was under surveillance by the police. During the stop the officer also noticed illegally tinted windows. The defendant was removed from the car and patted down for weapons. The officer smelled marijuana and the defendant seemed nervous. The officer told the defendant to “hang out in the back of the police car to calm down, questioning him about the marijuana smell. When the defendant refused and asked for an explanation of why he was being detained for a traffic violation, two officers put handcuffs on the defendant, put him in the back of the police car, and began searching the defendant’s car. Although one officer said he was going to read the Miranda rights to the defendant, he continued to talk with and question the defendant for an additional seven minutes. During the search a firearm and bag of unidentified pills were found in the glove compartment and a marijuana roach under the ashtray lid. The case was before the court on a motion to suppress.

Traffic stop.

Although traffic stops are seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, police may lawfully stop a car when there is probable cause to believe a crime is happening or a traffic violation has occurred. (Citations omitted.). The court found the two separate traffic violations, speeding and tinted windows, were valid reasons to stop the defendant. Although the defendant asserted the traffic stop was for pretextual reasons, the court held the officer’s subjective intent was not relevant, even when the officer’s real motive was a hope that narcotics or other contraband would be found as a result of the stop.

Detention beyond traffic stop – Smell of marijuana.

The issue was the impact of a burnt marijuana odor discovered during the course of a traffic stop. The court recognized the recent citizens’ referendum permitted recreational, as well as medical marijuana in Ohio. The court also recognized the questionable continued viability of State v. Moore which held the smell of marijuana was sufficient justification to search a car. Moore was decided when all marijuana was illegal in Ohio. The court recognized recent Ohio appellate court decisions questioning the Moore, decision, including State v. Gray, 2025-Ohio-4607 (1^st. Dist.), which held the odor of marijuana alone is not sufficient to justify continued detention and search of a car.

Reviewing the cases, the court held under federal law the odor of marijuana still "provides probable cause to search a car" because it "could lead a reasonable person to believe that the drug will be found in the car." United States v. Santiago, 139 F.4th 570, 574 (6th Cir. 2025). (Other citation omitted.). The court noted that while permitted in Ohio, marijuana remains illegal to use or consume while in a car. Ohio Rev. Code § 3780.36(D)(1).  As use of marijuana in a moving vehicle is illegal under Ohio law, there was probable cause of a crime if the police had reason to believe the defendant was smoking while driving the car.

Defendant’s behavior at the scene.

The court rejected the government’s alternate grounds of the defendant’s nervous appearance at the scene as ground to detain the defendant and search the car. The court noted nervousness, fidgeting, and apparent discomfort during a traffic stop is not uncommon and many people "become nervous during a traffic stop, even when they have nothing to hide or fear." United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 630-31 (6th Cir. 2004). (Other citation omitted.). Although nervousness may be a factor when reviewing the totality of the circumstances, it is not by itself sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for continued detention and search of a car.

Pre-Miranda statements.

The Miranda warning apply to custodial interrogation, but not all police questioning requires the Miranda warnings. Factors to consider as part of the totality of the circumstances to determine if the defendant was in custody include:

1) the interview's location;

2) the length and manner of questioning;

3) restraints, if any, on the individual's freedom of movement;

4) whether the individual was told that he needed to answer the question:

5) whether the defendant initiated the contact with the police; and

6)whether the defendant  acquiesced to a police request to answer questions.

In the present case the court held the defendant was not in custody when the car was stopped and the defendant ordered out of the car. The court noted it was a routine traffic stop on a public street during the day. Once, however, the defendant was told to get into the back of the police car and was handcuffed, the defendant was no longer free to leave. The court suppressed any statements made by the defendant after that time but before the Miranda warnings were given. Because the firearm and drugs found in the car was not the result of the defendant’s statements, the items were not suppressed.

Procedural issues.

1. Ex parte use of evidence and prior OVI conviction.

State v. Harris, 2026-Ohio-613 (9^th. Dist.). Felony OVI convictions and repeat offender specifications were reversed based on evidence obtained by the trial court without notice to counsel. The facts of the case were disputed. The officers testified the defendant was seen driving out of a bar parking lot at 1:30 a.m. After observing numerous mark lanes violations and lack of turn signal use, the defendant was pulled over. Officers testified the defendant initially pulled over onto the grass by the side of the road, but then reentered the road and stopped after making a turn at the next street. The officers observed slurred speech and the smell of alcohol from the defendant’s breath. According to the officers the defendant refused both field sobriety and chemical breath testing. An open can of beer and a partial bottle of tequila were found in the car.

The defendant and her witness testified the stop was made at 11:30 p.m. when the defendant drove out of a convenient store lot to take the passenger to the bar. The defendant offered sales receipts to show the earlier time. The defendant denied drinking any alcohol that night and asked the officers to give her the field sobriety and chemical test of her breath.

The defendant was charged with two fourth degree felonies, operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol with prior OVI convictions to enhance the charge from a misdemeanor to a felony. (R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a)), and refusal to submit to chemical testing with prior OVI convictions. (R.C. 4511.19(A)(2)(a)). After a bench trial the defendant was found guilty of both charges as well as the repeat offender specification. (R.C. 2941.1413.). The convictions were merged for sentencing.

First motion to suppress.

The defendant moved to suppress a prior OVI conviction for enhancement purposes, asserting the prior conviction was uncounseled with no waiver of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the court issued an order overruling the motion to suppress. In the trial court’s written order, however, the court noted it had obtained a copy of the defendant’s prior OVI plea proceeding in the municipal court and based its ruling on the contents of the recording.

Neither counsel introduced the recording or transcripts of the prior OVI proceeding and were not informed by the trial court of the use of the prior conviction recording until it appeared in the court’s order overruling the motion to suppress. On appeal the court held the trial court erroneously considered evidence that neither party introduced at the suppression hearing to determine if there was a valid waiver of counsel in the prior OVI proceeding.

There is no authority for a trial court to consider evidence outside the record and conduct its own investigation of the facts. State v. Rankin, 2024-Ohio-4564 (9^th. Dist.). (Par. 18, other citations omitted.). The trial court’s use of outside evidence denied counsel’s right to challenge the evidence as it could with evidence offered by the opposing party. The use of this evidence to decide a motion to suppress, which also involved an enhancing element of the offense, was held to be reversible error.⁶

Second motion to suppress.

The defendant filed a second motion to suppress challenging the validity of the traffic stop and the arrest. The trial court overruled the motion without a hearing. The trial court found the motion and supporting brief did not comply with Criminal Rule 47 to state with particularity the grounds for the motion. (Par. 21). Although the motion need not set out the grounds in excruciating detail, the motion must set out “legal and factual bases with sufficient particularity to place the prosecutor and the court on notice of the issues to be decided." State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54 (1994) and State v. Coduluppi, 2014-Ohio-1574. (Par. 22). In the present case the court found the motion to suppress set out a number of legal conclusions and evidence the defendant sought to suppress, which was not sufficient to meet the particularity requirements of Criminal Rule 47.

2. Speedy trial issues.

City of Strongsville v. Smith, 2026-Ohio-469. Convictions for failing to signal before changing course and speeding were reversed and vacated on lack of speedy trial grounds. The defendant did not waive speedy trial in either case in the municipal court.⁷ After numerous delays caused by the defendant, a final pretrial conference was held and a trial date was scheduled. Although the trial date was scheduled after the expiration of the speedy trial time, neither party objected to the date. On the day of trial the defendant moved to dismiss the charges for lack of speedy trial. After the motion was overruled the defendant entered a no contest plea to both charges and was found guilty.

Shifting burden of proof.

On a motion to dismiss, the defendant has the initial burden to show the case was not brought to trial within the time limits of R.C. 2945.71. Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case of noncompliance with R.C. 2945.71, the burden shifts to the prosecution to show a valid extension under R.C. 2945.72, including delays caused by the defendant, transfer from mayor’s court, and other reasonable delays. (Par. 11, 13. Citations omitted.).

Reasonable continuance.

The lack of objection by the defendant to a trial date beyond the speedy trial time is not a waiver of speedy trial by the defendant. A defendant is not required to object to a trial date beyond the speedy trial deadline to preserve any speedy trial violation. (Par. 19). Rather, in the absence of any express waiver by the defendant, the obligation is on both the prosecutor and the court to make sure the trial is scheduled within the appropriate time limit. (Par. 19, citations omitted.). Because the trial date was scheduled after the expiration of the speedy trial deadline, the defendant was entitled to dismissal of the charges.

R.C. 2945.72(H) permits a court to extend the time and grant a reasonable continuance on its own motion for a date beyond the speedy trial deadline. A trial date set by the court beyond the deadline without objection by the defendant is not, by itself, a reasonable continuance under R.C. 2945.72(H). Instead, the defendant must affirmatively agree to the extension beyond the deadline or the trial court must set out grounds to support a reasonable continuance. State v. Davis, 46 Ohio St.2d 444 (1976) and State v. Ramey, 2012-Ohio-2904. (Par. 22). In the present case the court found there was nothing in the record to show the fifty four day extension beyond the speedy trial time was a reasonable period of time.

3. Multiple OVI police reports.

City of Independence v. Murphy, 2026-Ohio-464 (8^th. Dist.). OVI, speeding, and seatbelt violation convictions were affirmed. After pacing the defendant shortly before 2:00 a.m at speeds of 80 to 90 mph, the officer turned on his overhead lights, and after engaging the siren multiple times, the defendant pulled over. When the officer approached he smelled alcohol from inside the defendant’s car. He also noticed the driver’s eyes were red, bloodshot, and glazed. Her speech was slurred. In response to a request for the defendant’s driver’s license, she gave the officer a credit card. The defendant refused all field sobriety and chemical tests. Based on the officer’s observations, the defendant was arrested for OVI. The defendant was found guilty after a bench trial.

The issue on appeal was the discrepancy, discovered at trial, of two different reports written by the arresting officer. The discrepancy came to light during the cross examination of the officer in which the defense report only indicated the odor of alcohol from inside the car. The prosecutor’s report, filed with the court, also indicated the odor of alcohol from the defendant. From the record it appears the defense report was a preliminary report, with additional facts contained in the final report.

The issue was raised on appeal as ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request a mistrial once the discrepancy was discovered. The appellate court noted that there was no indication that a mistrial would have been granted, if requested. Although the trial court reviewed the two reports and questioned the officer on the report process, the court did not indicate any serious issue about the reports. Both prosecutor and defense counsel were given the opportunity to question the witness after the judge’s questions, but declined to do so.

The court also noted that the lack of a mistrial request did not necessarily show deficient representation. Defense counsel used the discrepancies in the two reports to impeach the arresting officer, and as such, raising the issue of the credibility of the sole witness for the prosecution at trial. Even though unsuccessful, it was a matter of trial strategy, not ineffective representation. (Par. 28). Unsuccessful trial tactics and strategy are not, by themselves, ineffective representation.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove 1) defense counsel’s representations was deficient, and 2) a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The court held in the present case that the record did not support a finding in favor of the defendant on either of the two requirements.

4. Final lack of separate sentences and appealable order.

State v. Hartman, 2026-Ohio-**** (11^th. Dist.). Dismissal of appeal of OVI and endangering children offenses due to lack of final order. The defendant pled guilty to OVI and felony endangering children. The sentence for both offenses, including incarceration, fines, and license suspension, were included in one judgment entry, but did not contain a separate sentence for each offense.

On appeal, the court stated, “when an appellant is convicted of more than one offense and only a single sentence is imposed, the remaining offenses are left without a sentence, and this court is unable to determine to which offense the given sentence actually applies.” Citing State v. Garner, 2003-Ohio-5222 (11th Dist.). The court held in the absence of a sentence specified for each offense, the sentencing order was not a final appealable order. Due to lack of appellate jurisdiction, the court could not remand the case to revise the judgment entry, but instead, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (Par. 5).

Restitution and proximate cause.

State v. Veal, 2026-Ohio-488 (2d. Dist.). Restitution order on convictions for driving without a license and red light violation were reversed. The defendant drove through a red light colliding with another car. At the time of the collision the defendant’s driver’s license was suspended. The defendant entered a guilty plea to the license offense and no contest to the red light violation. The court conducted a hearing on restitution and ordered restitution to the other driver for the car payments he had made towards the purchase of his car.

A court may not order restitution for minor misdemeanor offenses that can be disposed of through the traffic violation waiver bureau under Traffic Rule 13(B). R.C. 2929.28(A)(1). In the present case the red light violation, as a minor misdemeanor, could not be the basis of the restitution order. (Par. 24). The issue raised was whether the suspended license conviction was a valid basis for the court to order restitution.

For purposes of restitution, a victim is "a person against whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or who is directly and proximately harmed by the commission of the offense or act." Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(D). The court found the collision was not consequences of the natural and continuous sequence of events following the defendant’s driving without a license and it was “not reasonably foreseeable that a traffic collision will occur simply because a person drives without a license.” (Par. 27).

In arriving at this conclusion, the court distinguished the decision in State v. Repine, 2007-Ohio- 5015 (10^th. Dist.). In Repine, restitution was affirmed for a driving without a license conviction. In that case, however, the defendant never possessed a driver’s license. The court in Repine reasoned the collision was a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s failure to adequately prepare himself to be a licensed driver and to demonstrate his preparation to the appropriate testing authorities, including understanding “speed requirements, stopping distances and defensive driving, any one of which would have prevented this collision." Repine at Par. 13.

In the present case the defendant had possessed a driver’s license, but it was suspended due to another traffic violation. The court found “it is not reasonably foreseeable that a traffic collision will occur simply because a person drives without a license” or driving without a license was a proximate cause of the collision (Par. 27-28). Reversing the restitution order, the court held the damage to the car was the result of the defendant’s minor misdemeanor red light violation, not the suspended license offense, and therefore restitution could not be ordered in this case.

Failure to comply with police order.

1. Separate offenses.

State v. Bash, 2026-Ohio-440 (5^th. Dist.). Two separate convictions for failure to comply with a lawful police order were affirmed. A police officer tried, but was unable to stop the defendant on a motorcycle for a speeding offense. The defendant accelerated instead of stopping when the officer attempted to stop the defendant.

A short time later the officer saw the same motorcycle, and once again, the defendant sped up, going through stop signs and other traffic control devices over a 4.2 mile chase, ending when the defendant hit a parked car. The defendant plead guilty to two counts of failure to comply and one count of cocaine possession. A separate prison term was imposed consecutively for each count. On appeal the defendant asserted the two failure to comply counts were allied offenses and should have been merged for sentencing.

Applying the standard set out in State v. Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995, the court found the two counts of failure to comply were separate incidents rather than a continuous chase. R.C. 2945.25. (Par. 10.). The initial offenses ended when the officer lost sight of the defendant and stopped the chase. Although close in time, the second offense occurred when the officer saw the defendant and again activated his lights and siren.

2. Lifetime driver’s license suspension.

State v. McLaughlin, 2026-Ohio-517 (9^th. Dist.). Lifetime driver’s license suspension for failure to comply with lawful police order was affirmed. This case arose out of a forty minute, high speed chase in excess of 100 mph of the defendant though multiple jurisdictions. The chase ended when the defendant crashed his car into a residential yard while trying to avoid police spiked stop sticks. The defendant entered a guilty plea to the felony charge of failure to comply with a lawful police order with the accompanying misdemeanor charges dismissed. The plea was based on an agreed twelve month prison sentence. At the time of the plea the trial court also explained a mandatory driver’s license suspension, with a minimum of three years to a lifetime suspension, would be imposed at sentencing.

At the time of sentencing the trial court indicated that after reviewing the facts of the offense, he would have been inclined to impose a greater prison term because of the defendnat’s conduct, but remained with the agreed twelve month term. (Par. 9). Based on the facts of the case, the court imposed a lifetime driver’s license suspension. The supporting facts included a prior separate convictions for failure to comply with a police order and obstructing official business. The trial court concluded the defendant “clearly lack the judgment to operate a motor vehicle,” and continued driving was a danger to the community. (Par. 11).

The appellate court affirmed the lifetime driver’s license suspension, noting, “Trial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range.” State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St. 3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, (Paragraph seven of the syllabus). The court further noted that the offense to which the defendant plead guilty included “a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property." R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii). The court also considered the specific factors required for this offenses under R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b), including the duration, distance, and speed during the offense. (Par.  19). Reviewing the facts of the case and consideration of the statutory factors, the appellate court held the defendant failed to show an abuse of discretion for the lifetime driver’s license suspension.

State v. Lugo-Casiano, 2026-Ohio-3711 (8^th. Dist.). Felony convictions for failure to comply with a lawful police order and disrupting public service were reversed on sentencing grounds. This case arose out of an incident where multiple vehicles blocked street intersections. The defendant fled the scene and was tracked by a police helicopter. The defendant pled guilty to two charges with the balance of the charges dismissed.

At sentencing the court imposed a 36 month suspended sentence on the failure to comply charge with a period of community control supervision and a class 2 driver’s license suspension under R.C. 4510.02 (three years to lifetime). A six month prison term was imposed on the disruption of public service.

Prison sentence.

R.C. 2921.331(D) requires any prison sentence for failure to comply with a lawful police officer to be served consecutively with any other incarceration. In the present case the trial court found the consecutive sentence requirement did not apply because the sentence was suspended. (Par. 8). The appellate court found that if a trial court imposes community control, the court must inform the defendant at sentencing of the possible penalties, including incarceration, for any violations of the community control conditions. The court may not, however, impose and suspend a term of incarceration and place the defendant on community control. The court noted, “Under R.C. 2929.19(B), prison terms and community-control sanctions are mutually exclusive and cannot be imposed at the same time on the same count of conviction.” (Par. 17, Citations omitted.). Similarly, a court cannot “suspend a prison term or make community control a condition of a suspended prison term.”  The court held imposing both a suspended sentence and community control was contrary to law. Consequently, the case was remanded for resentencing.

Driver’s license suspension.

The defendant in this case had a prior conviction for failure to comply with a police order. R.C. 2921.331(E) requires a class 1 (lifetime suspension), not a class 2 suspension period. In the present case the prosecutor and defendant agreed to a class 2 suspension, which the trial court imposed. As a mandatory class 1 suspension, the license suspension was contrary to law. The appellate court noted “the power to define criminal offenses and prescribe punishment is vested in the legislative branch of government.” (Par. 16, citations omitted.). Any agreement by counsel for a penalty less than that which is set out in a statute is contrary to law. (Par. 30). Due to the prior conviction a class 1 suspension was mandatory and the case was reversed for resentencing.

Consecutive felony sentences.

State v. Butler, 2026-Ohio-318 (11^th. Dist). Convictions for aggravated vehicular assault, failure to stop after an accident, OVI, aggravated assault, and possession of a fentanyl-related compound were affirmed. The defendant crossed the center line requiring an oncoming car to serve in avoidance and drove off the road into a culvert. The driver and two passengers were seriously injured. The defendant attempted to flee from the scene but was stopped. The defendant fought with the officers and was eventually subdued. Limited field sobriety tests were attempted and the defendant was arrested for OVI. During an inventory search of the car a fentanyl related compound was discovered.

The defendant entered guilty pleas on a negotiated plea agreement based in part on the prosecutor’s recommendation of concurrent minimum sentences. At the time of the plea the trial court explained both the recommended and possible longer sentence and informed the defendant that the court was not bound by the prosecutor’s recommendation. At the sentencing hearing, after reviewing the presentence report and victim impact statement and the defendant’s prior criminal record, the trial court imposed a greater sentence resulting in a longer time of incarceration.⁸

On appeal the defendant asserted the trial court improperly inserted itself into the plea negotiations and was bound by the prosecutor’s recommendation. The defendant based his argument on the statement made by the trial court at the time of the plea, stating, “The Court is not required to follow that, but if the Court should follow that, that's — you're guaranteeing yourself a 5-to-7-and-a-half-year sentence.” (Par. 13).

Although the appellate court noted the use of the term “guarantee” was ill advised, the trial court clearly explained on the record that it was a recommendation that the court was not required to accept. (Par. 20). The trial court complied with the requirements of Criminal Rule 11(C) informing the defendant of all of the rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea and the possible maximum penalties for each count. As the court noted, "The best way to ensure that pleas are entered knowingly and voluntarily is to simply follow the requirements of Crim.R. 11 when deciding whether to accept a plea agreement." State v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748. (Par. 17). Finding that the defendant acknowledged at the time of the plea that he was not promised any specific sentence, the court found the guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

State v. Vanhorn, 2026-Ohio-433 (9^th. Dist.). Convictions and sentence on OVI and three counts of aggravated vehicular assault were affirmed. The defendant ran a stop sign, hitting another car in the intersection, pushing the other car into a house. All three occupants of the other car were seriously injured. The defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol and had a prior OVI conviction in 2014.The defendant entered no contest pleas to the three charges, with the two vehicular assault charges amended to third degree felonyies. The defendant was given consecutive, three year sentences on the two vehicular assault changes, concurrent with the OVI offense.

On appeal the defendant disputed the consecutive felony sentences. The appellate court held, however, the trial court complied with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) engaging in the three step analysis and making sufficient findings for consecutive sentences. The trial court complied with the statutory requirements by finding "Consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime necessary to punish the defendant, and were not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offenses.” (Par. 12). The court also noted the defendant’s prior OVI and felony convictions. Although the same conduct, the court considered the offenses as separate based on the injury to the separate victims. (Par. 12). The trial court further found a course of conduct that caused harm “was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of the course of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the conduct.” (Par. 13).

State v. Anderson, 2026-Ohio-591 (5^th. Dist.). Consecutive sentences for two aggravated vehicular assault convictions were affirmed. While driving 82 mph on State route 23, the defendant failed to stop, running into the car in front. The driver and front passenger of the other car were seriously injured. There were also two children in the car. The test results of the defendant’s blood draw following a search warrant was .218 BAC. The defendant plead guilty to each count and received a four year sentence for each count, to be served consecutively.

On appeal the defendant asserted the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court complied with the requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C) to impose the sentences consecutively. When imposing consecutive sentences for felony offenses, a trial court is required to make the findings under R.C. 2929.14(C), but is not required to state reasons to support its findings." State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177. (Par. 18).

The trial court made the required findings and considered the factors for felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. The trial court also referred to specific portions of the victim impact statement, including the physical injuries, which included concussions and two of the occupants suffering broken bones and psychological trauma. The trial court also considered the defendant’s excessive speed and BAC. The court also noted the defendant’s prior OVI arrest which was amended to a reckless operation conviction. (Par. 15). Applying the statute the court found “consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the defendant; and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct and to the danger the defendant poses to the public." (Par. 20).