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Traffic Signals — March 2026

Dear Colleagues,March 9, 2026

This newsletter sets out a summary of Ohio court decisions issued in March, 2026, concerning impaired driving, alcohol and drugs of abuse, and other procedural related issues that may be raised in these cases. While not all of the cases involve impaired driving, they raise pretrial and post-judgment issues that would apply to OVI and vehicular homicide and assault cases.

The case summaries provide recent appellate decisions regarding Ohio law as applied to factual matters as well as interpretations and application of statutes and prior case law. Some cases also set out specific fact situations for determining reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or sentencing criteria which may be of assistance when reviewing motions to suppress.

As always, I am grateful to Paul Pfeifer, Trina Bennington, and the Ohio Judicial Conference staff for assistance in the distribution of the newsletter. Please feel free to call or email me with any feedback.

Patrick Carroll, retired judge

Ohio Judicial Outreach Liaison to the ABA

Carrolljol26@gmail.com

(216) 403-5521

OVI Prior conviction issues.

State v. Garee, 2026-Ohio-1108 (3d. Dist.). Felony OVI conviction and repeat offender specification were affirmed. The defendant was stopped for a traffic violation shortly after 1:00 a.m. A rolled up $20.00 bill with white powder residue was found in the defendant’s pocket. Based on the field sobriety tests, the defendant was arrested for OVI. The defendant refused the breathalyzer and after a search warrant was obtained, a blood sample was drawn which was positive for cocaine and Benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite.

The defendant was indicted on four related, separate OVI counts, all charged as felony offenses due to five prior convictions within the past twenty years. The defendant moved to suppress the prior convictions which was overruled. The case went forward as a bench trial but no witnesses were called to testify and the parties stipulated to the evidence, including judgment entries of conviction for prior OVI offenses and the toxicology report finding cocaine and cocaine metabolites in his system. Based on the evidence presented the court found the defendant guilty. The convictions were merged for sentencing with the prosecutor electing to proceed for sentencing on the R.C. 4511.19(A)(2)(a) conviction. (prior conviction and refusal).

Validity of prior convictions.

With three of the defendant’s prior OVI convictions there were multiple OVI offenses charged for the same incident for which the defendant was not sentenced. The defendant argued there was no final, appealable order in these cases, and therefore could not be considered as prior convictions. A valid judgment entry of conviction must comply with Criminal Rule 32(C), which requires:

1) the fact of the conviction,

2) the sentence,

3) the judge's signature, and

4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk.

(Par. 18-19). The other, prior OVI offenses were resolved by merger, but the judgment entry did not reflect merger of allied offenses. Criminal Rule 32(C), however, only requires “a full resolution of those counts for which there were convictions. It does not require a reiteration of those counts and specifications for which there were no convictions, but were resolved in other ways, such as dismissals, nolled counts, or not guilty findings.” (Par. 20, citations omitted.). The prior OVI judgment entries of conviction in this case all met the requirements of Criminal Rule 32(C).

. . . or plead guilty.

Based on the language of R.C. 4511.19, enhancement of an OVI charge is not limited to proof of a prior conviction, but also includes proof that the defendant plead guilty to the prior OVI offenses. Citing  State v. Gwen, 2012-Ohio-5046; State v. Ansley, 2006-Ohio-511 (5th Dist.). (Par. 16). A guilty plea in an OVI case is a statutory, alternative means to prove a prior OVI offense. (Par. 17). The judgment entries showed the defendant plead guilty in all three prior OVI cases.

Uncounseled guilty plea.

The defendant asserted his 2009 OVI conviction was based on a guilty plea without counsel or waiver of counsel. The court recognized a defendant has a limited right to collaterally attack a prior conviction that is used for penalty enhancement purposes when the defendant was “denied the fundamental right to be represented by counsel or an invalid waiver of counsel.” State v. Hogue, 2018-Ohio-1109 (3d Dist.). (Par. 24.). The burden is on the defendant to show the lack of counsel or valid waiver with the prior conviction. In the present case the judgment entry stated the defendant was present in court with “PD” (public defender). In addition, the defendant recalled there was someone present with him in court for that case from the public defender’s office, but could not recall the name of the person. The court found the defendant did not make a prima facie showing that his 2009 plea was uncounseled. (Par. 27).

State v. Ickes, 2026-Ohio-784 (11^th. Dist.). Felony OVI and driving under a suspended license convictions were affirmed. The defendant was charged with OVI as a third degree felony with five or more equivalent offense convictions in the past 20 years. The defendant entered no contest pleas to the charges and was found guilty.

On appeal the defendant asserted the trial court was required to advise the defendant that his prior OVI convictions could not be used to elevate his punishment if they were uncounseled or without waiver of counsel. Citing State v. Baiduc, 2007-Ohio-4963 (11th Dist.), the court held the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the convictions were uncounseled. Although a conviction must be supported by each element of the offense, as it relates to prior convictions as enhancements, the prosecution is only required to provide proof of the prior convictions, not the factual basis underlying each of the prior convictions. Moreover, the court noted there was nothing in the record that the defendant had previously entered uncounseled pleas to any of the prior OVI offenses.

Traffic stops and vehicle searches.

1. Valid traffic stop - Tinted license plate cover

State v. Arnold, 2026-Ohio-998 (4^th. Dist.). OVI conviction and order denying a motion to suppress were affirmed. The officer was on routine patrol when he passed the defendant’s car and was unable to read the license plate due to a tinted plate cover. The officer testified he normally calls out the plate to dispatch before making a stop but did not do so in this case because he could not read the plate. As he approached the car after the stop and a few feet from the defendant’s car he was able to read the license plate. The defendant was arrested and charged with OVI, driving under a suspended license, and display of plate. After the motion to suppress was overruled, the defendant entered a no contest plea to the OVI charge with the remaining charges dismissed.

The sole issue on appeal was the validity of the traffic stop based on the obstructed license plate. The defendant asserted the difficulty in reading the license plate was due to the location of the car in the shade and not the plate cover.

R.C. 4503.21(A) requires the license plate to be in plain view on the rear of the vehicle and shall not be covered by any material that obstructs its visibility. The statute does not set out any specific distance to see the plate. The issue in this case was not whether the defendant violated the statute with the license plate cover but whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the plate cover was in violation of the statute to justify a traffic stop. The court discussed and distinguished two cases to illustrate when a traffic stop is valid for an obstructed license plate.

1. State v. Brown, 2020-Ohio-896 (1^st. Dist.). The officer could not read the tinted covered plate from a normal distance but when he stopped directly behind the car at a traffic light, the plate was clearly visible. The officer was able to run the plate and verify the registration was valid and the driver was licensed. Because the plate was not obstructed, an objectively reasonable police officer would not have believed a violation of R.C. 4503.21 had occurred and the stop was not valid.

2. State v. Thomas, 2024-Ohio-5872 (11^th. Dist.). The officer could not read the plate or even determine if there was a plate on the car due to the plate cover. After he stopped the car and walked up to the car, he could read the plate about 10-15 feet from the car. The court found the stop had already occurred when the officer got out of the car and was able to read the plate. The determinative issue was whether the officer could read the plate before making the stop.

“The intent of the law is to require that license plates be visible to law enforcement personnel and others who may have reason to note the number for identification purposes. (Par. 13, citations omitted.). The issue is not whether the covered plate was a traffic violation, but instead, whether the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion from the totality of the circumstances that the covered plate was in violation of R.C. 4503.21. (Par. 20). The court found the officer was not able to read the plate until after the stop was made, and therefore, had a valid reasonable and articulable basis to inquire of the driver after the stop.

2. Valid traffic stop – illegally parked car.

State v. Williams, 2026-Ohio-860 (2d. Dist.). An order granting a motion to suppress was reversed. Around 10:00 p.m. in response to a report of an illegally parked car at a bus stop, the officer approached the car where the defendant was sitting in the driver’s seat with a woman in the passenger seat who was "not wearing a lot of clothing." The officer obtained the defendant’s driver’s license to check if the license was valid and for any open warrants. Finding the defendant was on federal probation for drug trafficking and weapons convictions, the officer had the defendant get out of the car and conducted a pat down. No weapons or other contraband was located. The officer later testified that he was not going to issue a parking ticket, but suspecting possible prostitution, wanted to separate the two people. When the officer told the defendant to sit in the back of the police car, the defendant ran away. The officer attempted to pursue the defendant on foot, but was unable to catch him. The defendant was subsequently charged with obstruction of official business in connection to his flight from the scene.

On the defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court found the initial traffic stop was valid due to a parking violation. As part of a valid stop the officer was permitted to ask for the defendant’s driver’s license and have the defendant get out of the car for officer safety. (Par. 7).

The trial court held, however, the officer’s request to have the defendant get into the police car prolonged the stop beyond its original purpose and unlawfully detained the defendant.

On appeal the court reversed the suppression order. An otherwise valid traffic stop becomes unlawful “if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation." Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015). Ohio law permits a police officer to order a motorist to step out of a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop without requiring any additional constitutional "quantum of suspicion." State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 408 (1993). (Par. 14). The officer may not order a person into a police car, however, unless it is to protect a person from a dangerous condition or the officer has a reasonable articulable belief of criminal activity beyond the initial traffic stop. (Par. 14).

In the present case the court found the defendant fled the scene before the stop was completed and therefore, was not unreasonably prolonged. (Par. 16). With a little over four minutes for the entire stop, the court found it was not an unreasonable length of time and reversed the trial court’s suppression order.

3. Valid traffic stop – improper right turn.

State v. Vance, 2026-Ohio-876 (11^th. Dist.). Convictions for drug possession discovered in the defendant’s car were affirmed. One of the issues raised in the case was the validity of the traffic stop. The officer saw the defendant make a right turn at a red light from a “straight only” lane on a highway exit ramp and the car tires cross over the double yellow line when making the turn. Affirming the order overruling a motion to suppress, the court held the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion from the traffic offenses to conduct a valid traffic stop. In arriving at this conclusion, the appellate court rejected the defendant’s assertion that the video recording was required to show the traffic violations. The court noted physical evidence was not required to prove a traffic offense and the officer’s testimony, standing alone, can be sufficient. (Par. 38, citations omitted.).

Regarding the search of the vehicle, the court found the officer’s observations of the defendant, with whom he had prior police involvement, take items out of her purse to conceal behind the passenger seat of the car. The defendant told the officer the item was a scale. A digital scale with methamphetamine residue was located in the car. Based on the totality of the circumstances, including, the location of the stop at a known location for criminal activity, the time of day, the officer’s familiarity with the defendant, the defendant’s suspicious behavior involving removing items from her purse and hiding them behind the passenger seat, there was sufficient evidence of probable cause to conduct a search of the car. (Par. 47-48).

4. Valid traffic stop - Invalid license plate.

State v. Giron, 2026-Ohio-753 (1^st. Dist.). Convictions for OVI, driving without a valid license, and possessing an open container of alcohol were affirmed. The defendant was stopped when an officer checked the license plate and found the car was listed to an unlicensed driver. The officer did not see any erratic driving. The defendant only spoke Spanish. The officer spoke with the defendant through Google translator. The defendant did not have a valid license. The officer observed bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and alcohol odor from the car and the defendant. There was also a half-empty, cold can of beer in the backseat. After conducting field sobriety tests, the defendant was arrested for OVI. The defendant submitted to a breath test with a .097 blood/alcohol result.

The defendant was charged with OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) (driving while impaired). During the suppression hearing the prosecutor was allowed over the defendant’s objection to amend the charge to a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d) (prohibited BAC). The trial court granted the motion to suppress on the HGN test finding it was not conducted in compliance with the NHTSA manual. The court denied the motion to suppress the balance of the field sobriety test. The defendant entered a no contest plea, found guilty, and appealed.

Amendment of OVI charge.

A criminal complaint may be amended at any time so long as the amendment does not change the name or identity of the crime. Crim. R. 7(D). A change in the name or identity of the charged crime occurs when an indictment is amended so that the offense alleged in the original indictment and the offense alleged in the amended indictment contain different elements requiring independent proof. State v. Dukes, 2003-Ohio-2386 (3d. Dist.). Although the elements of the offense were changed by the amendment, the court found the amendment was to a different subsection of the same criminal statute and did not change the name or identity of the offense. (Par. 25). In addition, because the defendant had previously been provided the breath test results, the defendant was not prejudiced by the amendment.

Reasonable suspicion for traffic stop.

The traffic stop was based on the report from the police computer system that showed the license plate was not valid. The officer was unable to see the driver until the traffic stop. The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle may not be lawfully operating it. (Par. 32).

Probable cause for arrest.

Probable cause for arrest is based on the totality of the circumstances available to the officer when the arrest is made. The suppression of the HGN test did not show the officer did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant in light of all of the other facts observed by the officer. The court noted the totality of the circumstances can support probable cause even when no field sobriety tests were given or when the results of field sobriety testing are excluded because they were not obtained in substantial compliance with NHTSA standards. State v. Hall, 2005-Ohio-4526, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.). (Par. 36). From the evidence in the record, including the defendant’s appearance, non-suppressed field sobriety tests, and other observations at the scene, there was probable cause to believe the defendant was impaired while driving his car.

5. Odor of marijuana for vehicle search.

State v. Tucker, 2026-Ohio-1045 (8^th. Dist.). An order granting suppression of evidence was affirmed on appeal. The defendant was stopped for an improper turn. At the traffic stop the officer smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana and saw a burnt marijuana cigar in the car’s ashtray. The defendant was the sole occupant in the car. A back up officer searched the car to see if there was marijuana in the car over the 2.5 ounces amount permitted to possess. The firearms were found in the search. The defendant was issued a citation for marijuana.

Vehicle search.

The Ohio Supreme Court held in State v. Moore, 2000-Ohio-10, “the smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” At the time of this decision both medical and adult use marijuana were illegal. Recently, with the legalization of both medical and adult use marijuana, at least one court has found "the smell of marijuana, standing alone, is no longer sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement." State v. Gray, 2025-Ohio-4607 (1st Dist.). Although smoking marijuana while operating a vehicle is illegal, the officer had no other evidence of any illegal activity or that the defendant possessed more than the 2.5 ounce limit. (Par.16). The court found the odor of marijuana alone was not sufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle.

Marijuana citation.

Although not directly involved in the disposition of the case, the appellate court raised an issue on the marijuana citation. The appellate decision did not state the nature of the citation. R.C. 3780.36(D) prohibits both the driver and passenger from smoking marijuana in a moving car, but only provides the penalty for the passenger as a minor misdemeanor. The court noted there was no penalty for a driver using marijuana unless under the influence. R.C. 3780.36(D)(1).¹

Author’s Note. Under prior law, R.C. 3780.36(D)(1) provided a penalty for a driver “while using adult use cannabis or while under the influence of adult use cannabis and is subject to R.C. 4511.19.” (Emphasis added.). Effective March 20, 2026, R. C. Chap. 3780 was repealed and the provisions move into R.C. Chap. 3796, which previously applied only to medical marijuana. The new law is still confusing. R.C. 3796.99(A)(1) provides marijuana use for the operator of the vehicle is subject to R.C. 4511.19 and R.C. 4511.194 “as applicable.” (Emphasis added.). A violation of marijuana use while operating a vehicle under R.C. 3796.36 is not an equivalent OVI offense under R.C. 4511.181, but it appears the OVI penalties in R.C. 4511.19 would apply to use of marijuana while driving regardless of actual impairment.

6. Valid traffic stop, vehicle exit, and pat down.

State v. Taylor, 2026-Ohio-1041 (8^th. Dist.). Convictions for having weapons while under disability, carrying a concealed weapon improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle were affirmed. The officer approached the defendant’s car due to the darkly tinted windows. When the defendant partially lowered the window the officer saw shattered glass on the car seat, although none of the car windows were broken. The defendant gave the officer his identification card and told the officer the driver’s license was on his phone.² The picture on the identification card looked different than in person.

The officer had the defendant step out of the car. The defendant kept his arm near the mid-section of his waist as he got out. Due to the unusual posture, the officer conducted a pat down and discovered a semi-automatic handgun in the defendant’s waistband. Following an order overruling a motion to suppress, the defendant plead no contest to the weapons charges.

Initial stop.

The defendant did not dispute the tinted windows. The appellate court noted “window tint violations provide probable cause for a traffic stop." (Par. 18). Illegally, excessively tinted windows provide reasonable suspicion for an officer to conduct a traffic stop. (Par. 18).

Removal from car.

Under Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), a police officer may order a driver or passenger to exit the vehicle if properly stopped for a traffic violation, even if the officer does not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See also, State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405 (1993). (Par. 19). Based on the facts of the case the court held the defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated by the order to get out of the car.

Pat down.

Removing a person from the car does not automatically permit an officer to conduct a pat down of the person. An officer may take further investigatory steps, including a pat down of the person, when the officer has a reasonable suspicion based on the other person’s conduct. (Par. 27). An officer may conduct a limited protective search when the officer reasonably believes the person may be armed or pose a danger. (Par. 27, citations omitted.). "The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence." State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St. 3d 405 (1993). (Other citation omitted.). In the present case the court found the defendant’s conduct, including the deliberate position of his arm near his waistband, gave reasonable notice to the officer that the defendant was attempting to conceal contraband to justify the pat down.

Plea procedures.

State v. Fincher, 2026-Ohio-822 (5^th. Dist.). Convictions for OVI (F-4) and failure to stop after a collision were affirmed. The convictions were based on guilty pleas with the balance of the charges dismissed. After being sentence to twenty months incarceration, the defendant appealed, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel and defective plea proceedings. The appellate court found defense counsel was not ineffective and the defendant had indicated on the record he was satisfied with defense counsel’s representation. Regarding the plea proceedings, the appellate court found the trial court complied with Criminal Rule 11.

In addressing the plea procedure in felony cases under Criminal Rule 11(C), the court distinguished between the waiver of constitutional rights, which include:

1) the right to a jury trial;

2) the right to confront one's accusers;

3) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination;

4) the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses; and

5) the right to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.

and non-constitutional rights, which include:

1) the nature of the charges;

2) the maximum penalty involved, which includes, if applicable, an advisement on post-release control;

3) if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or the imposition of community control sanctions; and

4) that after entering a guilty plea or a no contest plea, the court may proceed directly to judgment and sentencing.

Waiver of non-constitutional rights only requires substantial compliance with Criminal Rule 11. "Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving." State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200.

Author’s Note: For most misdemeanor offenses, Crim. R. 11(E) requires the trial court to only explain to the defendant the effect of a no contest, guilty, and not guilty plea. When the charge carries a jail sentence, the court is also required to advise the defendant of a right to counsel and appointment of counsel if the defendant is indigent. If the defendant proceeds without counsel after being advised of the right to counsel, the waiver of counsel must be recorded. Crim. R. 44, incorporated into Crim. R. 11(E). The same requirements apply to a serious misdemeanor offense, which involves a potential sentence of more than six months, with the trial court determining that the plea is voluntarily entered. Suggested best practices for a serious misdemeanor offense is to advise the defendant at the time of the plea of the waiver of all of the defendant’s constitutional rights.

1. Felony offenses and factual basis.

State v. Slepsky, 2026-Ohio-709 (11^th. Dist.). Convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide and two counts of aggravated vehicular assault were affirmed. The defendant drove through a stop sign and into the side of an ambulance, flipping the ambulance over, killing the patient, and seriously injuring the EMT who was in the back of the ambulance with the patient. The defendant was tested by urine for marijuana with a later test result of 52 nanograms per millimeter of marijuana metabolite.³ Prior to trial the prosecution filed a motion in limine to exclude the defendant’s expert’s testimony on:

1) the testing of the defendant’s blood;

2) the effect marijuana metabolite may or may not have on the impairment of an individual;

3) how long a metabolite remains in a person's urine after use; and

4) the defendant’s last marijuana use prior to the incident.

The trial court granted the motion and the defendant plead no contest to the charges.

Motion in limine; procedural issues.

A motion in limine is generally results in “a tentative, interlocutory, precautionary ruling by the trial court reflecting its anticipatory treatment of the evidentiary issue.” A ruling on the motion is not a final order, but subject to change based on the evidence presented at trial. State v. Grubb, 28 Ohio St.3d 199 (1986). (Par. 16). When the trial court grants a prosecutor’s motion in limine, the defendant is required to proffer the excluded evidence in the record to enable the court to make a final determination as to its admissibility and to preserve the issue on appeal. (Par. 17).

Unlike a ruling on a motion to suppress, a ruling on a motion in limine with a no contest plea does not preserve the issue on appeal because of the interlocutory nature of the order. State v. Guth, 2016-Ohio-8221 (11^th. Dist.). (Par. 22). In the present case, however, the court held the ruling on the motion in limine was preserved for appellate review because it was a final, rather than a preliminary review of the evidence. (Par. 22).

Merits of the motion in limine.

In the present case the defendant was charged with R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(viii)(II), a per se violation which required proof of marijuana metabolite in the blood or the urine in excess of a specific concentration. In addition, the marijuana metabolite level was based on a urine test, not a blood test. As such, the level of impairment or any tests of the defendant’s blood were not relevant to the charges in the case. Although the trial court’s ruling did not prohibit the defendant’s ability to challenge the accuracy of the urine results, but the defense could not use the separate blood result as a method of discrediting the urine results. (Par. 29).

Factual basis for no contest plea.

The defendant asserted the record did not contain sufficient facts to support convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular assault. The court noted a no contest plea is an admission of the facts in the indictment. The appellate court further noted the indictment contained sufficient allegations to set out the felony offenses. State v. Bird, 81 Ohio St.3d 582, 584, (1998). (Par. 33). In this case the court further noted the prosecutor filed a bill of particulars which provided additional information supporting the charges and was included as part of the record. (Par. 39). The court held the indictment in conjunction with the bill of particulars and the prosecutor’s explanation of circumstances at the time of the plea was sufficient to support the charges contained in the indictment. (Par. 42).⁴

Effect of no contest plea.

During the plea proceedings the trial court did not specifically, verbally explain the effect of a no contest plea as required by Criminal Rule 11. On appeal the court noted the effect of a no contest plea was contained in the written plea agreement that the defendant reviewed and signed. (Par. 62). The court found the defendant was not prejudiced by the oral omission and that he understood the effect of his no contest plea. (Par. 63).

Proximate result of operation with prohibited marijuana metabolite level.

An element of aggravated vehicular assault under R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) includes not only a violation of R.C. 4511.19, but also that the harm was the proximate result of the OVI offense.⁵ Issues arise when the OVI violation is based on a prohibited metabolite level which may not necessarily correspond to physical impairment. In State v. Balmert, 25-Ohio-5588, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed a conviction for aggravated vehicular assault involving a prohibited marijuana metabolite level, noting that the evidence in the record “that marijuana depresses a user's reflexes and slows reaction time, which can impair the user's ability to drive, especially in a situation calling for greater attentiveness" and “affects a user's depth and space perception as well as the user's ability to concentrate." (Par. 49). The court in Slepsky distinguished Balmert which was a bench trial with the present case because the conviction was based on a plea when the defendant admitted as part of the plea that he caused serious physical harm to another as a result of the OVI offense. (Par. 51).

2. Explanation of circumstances for misdemeanor offenses.

State of Ohio/City of Rossford v. Reams, 2026-Ohio-960 (6^th. Dist.). A conviction for reckless operation was affirmed, but the conviction for leaving the scene of the collision was reversed. The defendant was charged with OVI and leaving the scene of a collision after driving over a roundabout damaging a sidewalk, a curb, and landscaping, and then returning to the roadway to drive home. The damage to the area and the defendant’s car were discovered the next morning. A police investigation showed the defendant had ordered multiple alcoholic beverages from various bars the night before.

The defendant entered a guilty plea to leaving the scene. The OVI charge was amended to reckless operation which the parties stipulated was a second degree misdemeanor. The defendant subsequently withdrew the guilty pleas and entered no contest pleas to the same charges. The defendant did not consent to finding of guilt, but the finding of guilt was entered by the court after the explanation of circumstances provided by the prosecution.

Leaving the scene conviction.

The defendant was charged with a violation of R.C. 4549.02, which involved leaving the scene after a collision with persons or property on a public road or highway. Under this statute, damage to property surrounding a public road or highway, “including property immediately adjacent to the road itself such as property in the road's shoulder, is insufficient to support that element.”  State v. Teeple, 2018-Ohio-1767 (3rd Dist.). (Par. 13, Other citation omitted.).  In the present case the court found the damage was to the landscaping, sidewalk, and curb on the interior of the roundabout. None of these items were located on the road. Because the explanation of circumstances did not include an essential element of the offense, the record did not support the hit/skip conviction under R.C. 4549.02 and the conviction was reversed and vacated.⁶ When an explanation of circumstances does not set out all of the elements of the offense, the court should make a not guilty finding, which bars the charge to be refiled. City of Girard v. Giordano, 2018-Ohio-5024

Reckless operation conviction.

Regarding the reckless operation conviction, R.C. 4511.20 prohibits operating a motor vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property. From the damage caused by the defendant to the area off the road as well as his own car, however, the court could infer the willful or wanton driving by the defendant. “Driving through the center of a roundabout large enough to contain a sidewalk and landscaping, either intentionally or due to a lack of sufficient attention to the roadway,” and failing to notice the roundabout until he drove through it, supported the trial court’s for operating the car in a manner in which was in willful disregard of the safety of persons or property. (Par. 14).

Evidence of impairment.

State v. Held, 2026-Ohio-898 (1^st. Dist.). OVI with refusal and driving under suspension convictions and order overruling motion to suppress were affirmed. The officers were dispatched from a hit/skip collision and were provided the license plate and a description of the car which was registered to the defendant. The officers went to the defendant’s home and moments later, the defendant drove into the driveway. Based on several indicia of intoxication, the defendant was arrested for OVI and driving under a suspended license. The defendant’s motion to suppress for lack of probable cause to arrest was overruled and the case proceeded to a jury trial. The defendant was found guilty of OVI with refusal and driving under a suspended license.

The defendant asserted on appeal that the odor of alcohol and bloodshot watery eyes was not sufficient probable cause for an OVI arrest. Reviewing the record, however, the appellate court noted there were other signs of impairment, including slurred speech, erratic behavior, including being confused, agitated, and emotionally volatile. (Par. 7). While checking the car the officer saw and smelled fresh vomit in a coffee cup. The court noted the defendant’s refusal to submit to field sobriety tests was also a factor, among others, to consider when determining probable cause to arrest. (Par. 14).

The defendant also asserted the OVI conviction was not supported by the evidence. Setting out the same evidence as was presented in the suppression hearing, the court found there was sufficient evidence to support the OVI conviction. The jury had the opportunity to weigh the officer’s credibility along with the video of the incident. An additional factor for the trial was a subsequent encounter in a bar between the defendant and one of the arresting officers where the defendant admitted to the officer that he was intoxicated on the night of the arrest. (Par. 8, 21).

State v. Fogle, 2026-Ohio-722 (5^th. Dist.). Convictions for felonious assault, improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, and aggravated menacing were affirmed. The felonious assault charge was based on the defendant pointing an unloaded gun at the victim and pulling the trigger. Affirming the conviction the court noted a firearm is considered a deadly weapon whether it is loaded or unloaded. State v. Meek, 53 Ohio St.2d 35, 39 (1978). See also R.C. 2923.11(B)(1) ("'Firearm' includes an unloaded firearm").(Par. 10). Although the defendant asserted she did not intend to cause harm, the term “knowingly” refers to the act, which in this case was pointing and firing a weapon, not the result of the act. State v. Phillips, 77 Ohio App.3d 663, 665 (2d Dist. 1991). (Par. 12). Finding the evidence sufficient to support the conviction, which included act of pointing and firing a gun coupled with verbal threats, the appellate court found the defendant’s conduct met the standard to cause of attempt to cause harm.

Improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle.

Regarding the improper handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, the evidence showed the defendant had been drinking beer and throwing the empty cans in the street. A police officer at the scene smelled alcohol from the defendant in the car which grew stronger when the defendant was moved to an enclosed area. The defendant had red and glossy eyes, sluggish behavior, slow, slurred speech, and resting nystagmus. Later chemical tests results were over the prohibited level for both alcohol and marijuana. Improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle under R.C. 2923.16(D) incorporates the impairment and prohibited alcohol and drug levels contained in R.C. 4511.19 for being under the influence. (Par.31.).

Pretrial motion required.

The defendant attempted to challenge at trial the compliance of required refrigeration of the defendant’s urine and blood samples. The method to challenge the storage and testing of the urine and blood samples was by a pretrial motion to suppress, not by cross examination at trial. (Par. 43).Citing State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446 (1995), the court held objections to the admissibility of a chemical test based on the State's compliance with the Ohio Department of Health's regulations was required to be raised by a pretrial motion to suppress. (Par.45). The lack of a pretrial motion in this case resulted in a waiver of any objections to the refrigeration requirements by the Ohio Department of Health.

OVI sentencing issues.

1. Vehicle forfeiture and supplemental financial penalty.

State v. Kirk, 2026-Ohio-1102 (9^th. Dist.). OVI conviction and supplemental fine from forfeiture of vehicle were affirmed. The defendant was stopped for driving at night without headlights and going the wrong way on a one way street. The defendant was charged with both of those offenses as well as driving under a suspended license and OVI with two prior convictions in ten years and refusing to submit to a breathalyzer. The defendant subsequently entered a no contest plea to the OVI and minor misdemeanor charges with the balance of the charges dismissed. The court imposed a fine, jail sentence, and license suspension.

A vehicle forfeiture hearing was conducted which showed the lienholder had paid the impound lot for release of the vehicle and had subsequently sold the car to an unrelated third person. Pursuant to R.C. 4503.234 (E), the court determined the value of the car and imposed an additional fine of $17,000, representing the car’s value.

Supplemental forfeiture penalty.

The defendant asserted the supplemental forfeiture fine violated the excessive fines prohibition clause of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(c)(v) sets out the authority for the court to order the forfeiture of a vehicle in applicable OVI cases. R.C. 4503.234(E) provides when the title of the vehicle subject to forfeiture is transferred or assigned, the court may fine the offender the value of the vehicle as determined by publications of the national auto dealers association.⁷

In the present case the defendant did not dispute the value of the car. The court applied the standard of review in State v. O’Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, recognizing that O’Malley involved the forfeiture of a car in an OVI offense. The standard applied to forfeiture of a vehicle was the same as forfeiture of the value of the vehicle. Citing O’Malley, the issue was whether the forfeiture is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense.” relying on United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998), fn. 10. The gravity of the offense means the seriousness and severity of the crime. (Par. 12, citation omitted.).

Reviewing the gravity of the offense in the present case, the court noted the defendant was driving in the early morning hours in the dark with no headlights going the wrong way on a one-way street. (Par. 14).The defendant had two prior OVI convictions, one of which was from the previous year. The defendant did not successfully complete the field sobriety tests, appeared extremely intoxicated, and was yelling and behaving aggressively toward the sheriff’s deputies. Weighing these factors, the forfeiture penalty was not grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense.

2. Prison sentence.

State v. Shefbuch, 2026-Ohio-708 (3d. Dist.). Convictions and sentences for felony drug possession and OVI were affirmed. The convictions were based on a no contest plea to drug possession and operating a motor vehicle with a specified concentration of a controlled substance in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(f) (high tier alcohol level). A twelve month prison term was imposed which the defendant appealed.

Affirming the prison sentence, the court noted trial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the statutory range and the sentence is generally valid so long as the applicable statutory sentencing factors are considered. (Par. 8, citations omitted.). In the present case the court found the trial court properly considered the statutory sentencing principles and purpose of sentence, including the seriousness of the offense and recidivism factors. (Par. 13). Specifically, the court noted the defendant had an extensive criminal history, continued drug use, and two probation violations including the failure to complete multiple court mandated drug and alcohol rehabilitation treatments. The record supported the trial court’s judgment that from his past record, the defendant was not amenable to community control.

Failure to comply with lawful police order.

1. Venue.

In Re S.H., 2026-Ohio-1077 (1^st. Dist.). Delinquency adjudication was affirmed for acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offense of failure to comply with a police officer's order. As they approached an intersection, two officers saw a car from the right approaching the intersection at a high rate of speed. Both cars arrived at the intersection at the same time and the officer waived the other car to go forward. The other car turned left in the officer’s direction, allowing the officers to record the license plate number. The officers turned around to follow the car but the other car accelerated. As the officers were going 60 mph in a 35 mph zone, they could not catch up.

The other car continued to speed away, going down a dead end street. The officers waited at the street in a parking lot and when they saw the car coming back, attempted to stop the car. The officers pulled behind the car and activated overhead lights and siren. The other car accelerated with the officers following. The officers testified they were traveling at 80 mph, but the other car continued to pull away. The car finally pulled into a wooded area with three of the passengers running into the woods. The driver remained at the car which was damaged from collision during the chase. The driver admitted driving the car. After a hearing before the court magistrate the driver was adjudicated delinquent.

The juvenile asserted on appeal that there was no testimony the incident occurred in Hamilton County and therefore, venue was not shown. Venue is a fact necessary to show compliance with a defendant's constitutional and statutory rights but is not an element of an offense. State v. Musarra, 2025-Ohio-5058. Venue is not related to the culpability. Lack of evidence to prove venue is a dismissal, not an acquittal. (Par. 14).⁸

Venue can be proved by either express testimony or by all the facts and circumstances in the case."  State v. Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 477 (1983). In the present case the court found there was sufficient evidence in the record to establish venue. Although the name of a road or responding police department may not, by itself be sufficient to prove venue, the officers’ testimony in this case included specific street names, intersections, and local landmarks to show the location of the offense.

2. License suspension.

State v. Head, 2026-Ohio-700 (9^th. Dist.). Conviction for failure to comply with lawful police order and 20 year driver’s license suspension were affirmed. The defendant led the police with flashing lights on a 20 minute chase on I-71, driving in a reckless manner. The court opinion did not set out any specific facts with the chase. The defendant entered a no contest plea to an amended 4^th. degree felony offense with an agreed sentence of two years nonresidential supervision. At the time of the plea the court informed the defendant of a mandatory driver’s license suspension of three years to a lifetime suspension.

At the sentencing hearing after reviewing the presentence report, the trial court adhered to the recommended sentence and imposed a twenty year license suspension. The defendant appealed the license suspension. The defendant did not dispute the license suspension was mandatory and the twenty year period was within the statutory range for the conviction, but argued the trial court misconstrued the statutory sentencing factors.

Affirming the license suspension, the court noted, “Protecting the public is a purpose of a felony sentence under R.C. 2929.11(A).” (Par. 17). In this case police officers, sheriff deputies, and the general public were at risk of harm due to the defendant’s conduct. In addition, the defendant had a marijuana use disorder. From these facts the license suspension was not contrary to law.

Driver’s license suspension issues.

1. Administrative license suspension.

State v. Wilhite, 2026-Ohio-859 (2d. Dist.). An order overruling a motion to terminate an administrative license suspension was affirmed. The defendant was stopped, arrested, but not charged with OVI. The defendant refused to submit to a breath test resulting in an administrative license suspension. During the course of the stop the officer discovered drugs which led to an indictment of aggravated drug possession. The issue of the defendant’s license suspension was raised by defense counsel at a hearing in January. At a later pretrial conference in June, defense counsel stated she attempted to file a motion in the drug case to terminate the ALS but was told it was a civil case. A motion to terminate was filed the same day and overruled by the trial court as beyond the thirty day time for appeal under R.C. 4511.197. The issue raised on appeal was the order overruling the motion to terminate the license suspension.

ALS as civil proceeding

On appeal the defendant asserted ineffective assistance of counsel for not timely filing the motion to terminate. Administrative license suspension proceedings are civil and remedial, being distinct from criminal OVI prosecutions. Cleveland v. Oliver, 2024-Ohio-1477 (8th Dist.). (Par. 20).⁹ It is a separate civil/administrative remedial matter unrelated to the criminal case in which the defendant is charged." State v .Wisby, 2003-Ohio-5834 (1st Dist.). The court found the defendant did not have a right to counsel in a civil proceeding and therefore,  there was no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in a civil case. (Par. 21).

Felony drug case was not the proper forum to appeal ALS.

The court found an administrative license suspension under R.C. 4511.192 and the procedures for appeal under R.C. 4511.197 are related to the arrest and charge of an OVI related offense. (Par. 13). The court also referred to R.C. 4511.191(D) which requires the defendant to be charged with an OVI offense. The court recognized that while an administrative license suspension predicated on a refusal to test does not require an OVI conviction, it does require an arrest and charge of an OVI-related offense. (Par. 14). While the court questioned the validity of the ALS due to the lack of an OVI related charge, the suspension was not part of the felony drug case. The proper course of action was a separate civil appeal of the ALS, not a motion to terminate the suspension as part of the drug charge.

Five day hearing on license suspension.

R.C. 4511.196(A) requires a court appearance within five days of the OVI arrest. The court in not required to conduct an ALS appeal within five days. State v. Leitwein, 2020-Ohio-3698 (5th Dist.). From that court appearance, a defendant has thirty days to file an appeal of the ALS. R.C. 4511.192(D)(1)(a). The five day appearance requirement does not apply to non-OVI related charges, such as the felony drug charge in the present case. (Par. 31). Although the thirty day time for appeal runs from the initial court appearance, the statute does not prevent a defendant from filing the ALS appeal prior to the five day hearing. The court concluded the lack of a five day hearing was not grounds to vacate the ALS.

Restitution issues.

State v. Hearns, 2026-Ohio-854 (2d. Dist.). A conviction for leaving the scene of the collision was reversed on the restitution order. The defendant lost control of his car, crashed into a building, and caused damage in excess of $41,000. The defendant did not remain at the collision scene. After being found and charged, the defendant plead no contest to the hit/skip charge (M-1) with dismissal of the reckless operation (M-3) and failure to control (MM) charges. The defendant did not provide proof of insurance. The trial court held the statutory $5,000 restitution limit under R.C. 4549.03(B) did not apply due to the victims right of full and timely restitution, Ohio Const. Art. I, Sec.10a(A)(7), and ordered restitution of $41, 850.

On appeal the restitution order was reversed and vacated. The court did not address the amount of restitution regarding either the victim’s right of full and timely restitution or the municipal court’s monetary limitation in civil cases under R.C. 1901.17. Instead, the court found the damage to the building was not the direct and proximate cause of the defendant’s leaving the scene of the collision.

Economic loss and proximate cause.

R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) limits restitution to restitution to the victim’s economic loss. “Economic loss” is defined as any economic detriment suffered by a victim as a direct and proximate result of the commission of an offense. . . R.C. 2929.01(L). Economic loss is dependent upon whether the injury or damage is the proximate result of the offense at issue. State v. Carson, 2024-Ohio-5407 (2d Dist.) (Par. 11, other citations omitted.).¹⁰ Proximate causation is when the harm has a sufficiently close connection to the conduct at issue. (Par. 33, citation omitted.). 

The damage to the building was caused by the defendant’s loss of control and reckless operation of the vehicle, not the act of driving away from the scene. At the time the defendant drove away, the damage had already been done. Therefore, the damage to the building was not the direct and proximate cause of the hit/skip. The court noted the property damage from the collision existed regardless of whether the appellant subsequently left the scene of the collision. (Par. 36). Moreover, as the court noted, a driver may be charged for leaving the scene even when the driver did not cause the collision. (Par. 35). In the absence of proximate cause from the convicted offense, restitution cannot be ordered.

Statutory damages.

R.C. 4549.03(B) provides a limited amount of payment when the defendant convicted of hit/skip is uninsured. Damages up to $5,000 may be ordered for economic loss when the collision “was the direct and proximate result of the offender's operation of the motor vehicle before, during, or after committing the offense charged.” ¹¹(Emphasis added.). The statute provides a limited amount of recovery, but is broader than direct proximate cause. The critical distinction is that the statutory damages include conduct before and after the commission of the hit/skip.

Thus, even though the hit/skip offense is not the direct and proximate of the damage, “restitution can still be obtained for any economic loss arising from a collision that was the direct and proximate result of the offender operating his motor vehicle before, during, or after, committing the hit-skip offense as long as the order of restitution does not exceed $5,000.” (Par. 21, citing Columbus v. Wood, 2017-Ohio-3081 (10^th Dist.)). See also, Cleveland v. Poythress, 2024-Ohio-2911 (8^th. Dist.)(affirmed restitution under R.C. 4549.03(B) when the defendant was uninsured and the damage amount was less than $5,000.

The $5,000 statutory damage provision is limited to those specific offense when the defendant was not insured. It does not prevent the victim from seeking additional monetary damages in a separate civil action. R.C. 2929.18(H)[felony] & R.C. 2929.28(H) [misdemeanor]. For other offenses, such as OVI, in which the damage was the direct and proximate result of the impaired vehicle operator, any limitation of damages would be in violation of a victim’s right to “full and timely” restitution under the Ohio Constitution. See, Cleveland v. Fuller, 2023-Ohio1669 (8^th. Dist.).

Author’s Note: A different outcome may have occurred if the reckless operation charge was not dismissed. R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) excludes restitution for a minor misdemeanor or any

misdemeanor offense that could be disposed of by the traffic violations bureau under Traffic Rule 13. As a third degree misdemeanor, the reckless operation charge could be a basis for ordering full restitution if shown the damage was the direct and proximate result of the reckless operation.

R.C. 2930.06(A)(1)(b) & (c) require the prosecutor to confer with the victim before amending or dismissing an indictment, information, or complaint as well as any negotiated plea. The trial court has the obligation to determine that the victim was notified and explained the effect of the amendment, dismissal, or negotiated plea. The court may not proceed if notice was not provided to the victim unless the prosecutor sets out the attempts to notify the victim. R.C. 2930.06(A)(3).

Miscellaneous.

1. Attorney/client relationship.

State v. Schaumleffel, 2026-Ohio-843 (5^th. Dist.). OVI conviction was affirmed. The issue in this case concerns the defendant’s relationship with his attorney. After the defendant was arrested for OVI, he was appointed counsel by the trial court. After this attorney was permitted to withdraw due to irreconcilable differences with the defendant, a second attorney was appointed to represent the defendant. The second court appointed counsel also sought to withdraw due to letters the defendant sent directly to the trial judge complaining about the second appointed counsel. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw after a hearing with the defendant given the opportunity to speak. The defendant explained his complaint was based on lack of access to the attorney, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw. The case subsequently proceeded for trial and the defendant was found guilty of the charge.

The defendant asserted on appeal ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court noted, however, that the defendant did not cite any specific instance in which defense counsel performed deficiently or was not effective. The court rejected the defendant’s assertion that defense counsel’s motion to withdraw showed inability to effectively represent the defendant. The court noted that defense counsel filed the motion, not the defendant. When the trial court inquired to the defendant about the issue, the defendant told the court he was not dissatisfied with defense counsel’s representation. Based on the foregoing, the trial court was not obligated to remove the defense counsel in this case.

2. Officer testimony and video recording.

State v. Caughenbaugh, 2026-Ohio-1153 (5^th. Dist.). An order granting a motion to suppress in an OVI case was reversed. The officer testified that he stopped the defendant when he saw the driver go over the centerline. The conditions at the time were dark with a misty drizzle. The officer’s dash camera was not able to record the traffic violation. The trial court held there was insufficient credible testimonial evidence that the defendant committed a traffic infraction

This is the second time this case was appealed on the trial court’s order to suppress the stop.¹² In the prior appeal the order granting suppression was reversed based on the trial court’s reliance on the video recording. The appellate court held the officer’s testimony must be considered, regardless of credibility, rather than sole reliance on the video recording.

On remand the trial court again granted the motion to suppress, finding “insufficient credible testimonial evidence that the defendant committed a traffic infraction." (Par. 16.). In the second appeal the court held although it is the trial court’s role to determine witness’s credibility, the trial court did not specify how the officer’s testimony was insufficient. The appellate court noted the trial court did not explain if the officer’s testimony was not credible or if a traffic violation did not occur to justify a valid traffic stop. In a concurring opinion, a judge noted the trial court referred to probable cause as the basis for the traffic stop instead of the lesser standard of reasonable, articulable suspicion. In addition, the issue was not whether the defendant committed a traffic violation, only whether there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to make the stop based on the officer’s observations. (Par. 23).

Even minor misdemeanors get appealed.

State v. Smith, 2026-Ohio-806 (5^th. Dist.). A conviction for prohibited use of an electronic device while driving was affirmed. The defendant was seen looking at and manipulating a cell phone while driving. At the traffic stop the defendant told the officer he was entering an address in the cell phone to obtain a location to pick up his son. At the bench trial the officer testified the phone was in the defendant’s right hand above the steering wheel and could be readily seen. The defendant introduced three self-made re-enactment videos indicating the cell phone was not visible from the officer’s view. The defendant was found guilty of the charge and appealed challenging the sufficiency and weight of the evidence in support of the conviction.

Under both standards the court of appeals rejected the defendant’s assertions.¹³ Although the defendant disputed the officer’s testimony, the court noted the “weight to be given to the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are issues for the trier of fact.” (Par. 18). The court found the officer’s testimony was sufficient to support the conviction.

Cleveland v. Johnson, 2026-Ohio-739 (8^th. Dist.). A conviction for following another vehicle too closely was reversed. The defendant plead not guilty and sought a witness list and other discovery from the prosecutor. The prosecutor requested the defendant’s email to provide discovery, but the defendant was reluctant to provide his email address and provided a post office box instead. After a continuance due to the lack of discovery provided to the defendant, the case proceeded to a bench trial. The defendant was found guilty and fined.

On appeal the court reversed the conviction due to the prosecutor’s failure to provide discovery to the defendant. The court held under Criminal Rule 16 the prosecutor was required to provide timely requested discovery to the defendant. The prosecutor did not have the right to determine the method to send the discovery to the defendant.